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ARGUMENT 
The prior decision of the Supreme Court in this matter 
appears to be based primarily upon its holding that, under Utah 
law as it existed at the time of Burtons' execution upon the 
property, a creditor was not allowed to disregard an alleged 
fraudulent conveyance and execute directly upon property in the 
hands of an alleged fraudulent transferee, but must first bring 
an action to set aside the alleged fraudulent conveyance prior to 
conducting an execution upon the property.^ 
Burtons respectfully submit that this holding is directly 
contrary to the language of the controlling provision of the Utah 
Fraudulent Conveyances Act, UCA Section 25-1-15 (1953) (repealed 
19 88) which stated: 
UCA 25-1-15 Rights of creditors with matured claims. 
Where a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent as to a 
creditor, such creditor, when his claim has matured, 
may, as against any person, except a purchaser for fair 
consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the 
time of the purchase or one who has derived title 
immediately or mediately from such a purchaser: 
(1) Have the conveyance set aside or obligation 
annulled to the extent necessary to satisfy his claims; 
or 
(2) Disregard the conveyance, and attach, or levy 
execution upon, the property conveyed. 
A purchaser who without actual fraudulent intent 
has given less than a fair consideration for the 
conveyance or obligation may retain the property or 
obligation as security for repayment. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Under this statute, creditors were expressly given the 
option of either bringing an action to set aside the fraudulent 
conveyance, or of disregarding the conveyance and executing 
directly upon the property. The Court's decision in this case 
renders Section 25-1-15(2) a nullity. 
true and correct copy of the Court's Decision, dated 
February 19, 1993, is attached as an addendum hereto. 
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The Court addressed Section 25-1-15(2) on page 9 of its 
decision, wherein the Court held, in essence, that the remedy 
provided by Section 25-1-15(2) is not available until after the 
creditor has brought an action to set aside the conveyance. 
However, this argument overlooks the relationship between Section 
25-1-15(1) and 25-1-15(2). Moreover, requiring a creditor to 
first bring an action to set aside the conveyance overlooks the 
express language of Section 25-1-15(2) which allows a creditor to 
"disregard the conveyance." 
Burton's construction of Section 25-1-15(2) is supported by 
the Supreme Court's decision in Jensen v. Eames, 519 P.2d 236 
(Utah 1974) . In Jensen, a judgment creditor served a 
post-judgment writ of garnishment upon a third party, to whom the 
judgment debtor had allegedly fraudulently conveyed certain 
shares of stock. Within the garnishment proceeding, the creditor 
moved to have the sale of stock set aside as a fraudulent 
conveyance. The trial court denied the motion on the grounds 
that such action could not be taken in a garnishment proceeding 
and that the creditor must file a separate action. The Supreme 
Court reversed the decision of the trial court on this issue, 
holding at page 42 8: 
A judgment creditor may litigate the question of a 
fraudulent conveyance in a garnishment proceedings, in 
a creditor's bill in equity, or in an execution 
proceeding, provided that once contested the burden is 
upon the one alleging the fraudulent conveyance to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 
transfer was in fact fraudulent. (Emphasis added.) 
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A l t h o u g h J e n s e n i s f a c t u a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from the 
present case, Jensen i s cons i s ten t with Burtons1 pos i t i on t h a t , 
under Sec t i on 2 5 - 1 - 1 5 ( 2 ) , a c r e d i t o r may seek a post-judgment 
remedy agains t a l l e g e d f r a u d u l e n t l y conveyed p r o p e r t y in the 
hands of a t r a n s f e r e e without f i r s t br inging an ac t ion to se t 
as ide the conveyance. 
The only au thor i ty c i t ed in support of the Cour t ' s holding 
t h a t a c r e d i t o r must f i r s t b r i n g an a c t i o n to s e t a s i d e a 
fraudulent conveyance i s Butler v . Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 
1987), which s t a t e s a t page 1262s "The remedy provided by the 
Ac t f o r a f r a u d u l e n t conveyance i s t h e v o i d i n g of t h e 
conveyance ." However, t h e r e i s no th ing w i t h i n B u t l e r which 
suggests t h a t the voiding of a fraudulent conveyance can only be 
achieved through a spec i f ic ac t ion to se t as ide the conveyance. 
That issue was not before the Court in But le r . 
B u r t o n s ' c o n s t r u c t i o n of Sec t ion 25-1-15(2) i s f u r t h e r 
s u p p o r t e d by UCA S e c t i o n 2 5 - 1 - 8 , which d e c l a r e d t h a t a l l 
conveyances made with in ten t to defraud conveyances " s h a l l be 
v o i d , " and by a l l of the p r i o r Utah f r a u d u l e n t conveyances 
dec i s ions , which uniformly held tha t f raudulent conveyance a r e 
" v o i d . " Some of t h e s e cases went so far as to descr ibe such 
c o n v e y a n c e s a s " v o i d i n t o t o , " W.P . Nob le M e r c a n t i l e 
Co. v . Mt. Pleasant Equitable Co-op I n s t . , 42 P. 86*9 (Utah 1894) 
and "as i f t he t r a n s a c t i o n never took p l a c e a t a l l . " Meyer 
v . General American Corporation, 569 P.2d 1094, 1098 (Utah 1977); 
Cardon v. Harper, 151 P.2d 99, 102 (Utah 1944). Prior to the 
present case, no Utah Supreme Court decision suggested that such 
conveyances are merely "voidable" rather than "void," 
notwithstanding the express language of Section 25-1-8. Even if 
this is a reasonable construction of Section 25-1-8, Section 
25-1-15(2) expressly allows creditors to "disregard the 
conveyance" and execute upon property which is in the hands of an 
alleged fraudulent transferee. 
The Court further states on page 9 of its decision that, 
even if Section 25-1-15(2) allows a creditor to execute directly 
upon property in the hands of a fraudulent transferee, such a 
remedy was not available against Baldwin because Baldwin was not 
Willard Woods1 immediate successors in interest. However, 
Section 25-1-15 addresses situations in which alleged 
fraudulently conveyed property has passed through the hands of 
multiple transferees, and exempts only bona fide purchasers and 
those who purchase "immediately or mediately" from bona fide 
purchasers. Although Baldwin may have been exempt from execution 
if she was a bona fide purchaser, the statute clearly applies to 
remote transferees who are not bona fide purchasers. The Court's 
decision erroneously limits Section 25-1-15(2) to immediate 
transferees in all instances. 
The most important point which Burtons wish to make in this 
Petition is that, even if -they were ultimately incorrect in their 
interpretation of Section 25-1-15(2), Section 25-1-8 and the Utah 
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cases which uniformly described fraudulent conveyances as "void," 
Burtons' actions were based upon a good faith interpretation of 
these authorities. A literal reading of Section 25-1-15(2) 
certainly appears to allow Burtons to act as they did. Burtons 
should not be subjected to an award of attorneys fees for having 
acted in bad faith where their conduct was consistent with a 
reasonable interpretation of the relevant legal authorities. 
The Court held on pages 13-17 of its opinion that Burtons 
are liable for attorney's fees under UCA Section 78-27-56(1). 
Section 78-27-56(1) provides that attorney's fees may be awarded 
against a party which asserts an action or defense which is 
"without merit" and which is "lacking in good faith." The 
"without merit" element of Section 78-27-56(1) requires that the 
subject action or defense be "frivolous" or "having no basis in 
law or fact." Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 19830. 
The "lacking in good faith" element of Section 78-27-56(1) 
requires the absence of one or more of the following: "(1) An 
honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; (2) 
no intent to take unconscionable advantage of others; (3) no 
intent to, or knowledge of the fact that the activities in 
question will hinder, delay or defraud others." Id. at 151. The 
existence of bad faith is a subjective question of state of 
mind. Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 
1989) . 
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Burtons submit that their conduct in this case does not fall 
within either elements of Section 78-27-56 (1) . As previously 
stated, Burtons acted in accordance with their apparent rights 
under UCA Section 25-1-15(2), 25-1-8 and relevant Utah case law. 
In holding that void in fact means "voidable," the Court relied 
wholly upon authorities from outside the State of Utah, which 
Burtons could not have foreseen. Moreover, the Court's holding 
that a creditor must bring a separate action to set aside a 
fraudulent conveyance before executing upon alleged fraudulently 
conveyed property overlooks the relationship between UCA Section 
25-1-15(1) and (2). 
Even if Burtons are ultimately incorrect in their 
interpretation of Section 25-1-15, this does not mean in itself 
that Burtons' legal position was "without merit." As this Court 
stated in regard to URCP 11 in Barnard v. Sutliff, 202 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 17, 20 (Utah 1992): 
Nor does rule 11 require the attorney to reach the 
correct legal position from the research. It is enough 
that the attorney's reading of the law is a reasonable 
one. Thus, once an attorney forms a reasonable opinion 
after conducting appropriate research, the mere fact 
that the attorney's view of the law was wrong cannot 
support a finding of a rule 11 violation. 
Burtons' interpretation of Section 25-1-15 is at least 
tenable, and was not directly contrary to any controlling Utah 
authority. Therefore, Burtons' position should not be declared 
to be "without merit." 
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Regarding the "lack of good faith" element, there is 
absolutely no evidence in the record that Burtons did not 
honestly believe in their legal position, or that they acted out 
of any improper motive. The Court's decision of this point, 
which appears upon page 17 of the decision, was bas€>d solely upon 
the fact that Burtons issued a praecipe directing the Sheriff to 
levy upon the "right, title and interest" of Baldwins as 
"successors in interest to Willard D. Wood." The Court held that 
"Baldwins were not successors of Willard Wood" and n[H]ad Burtons 
proceeded with an honest belief in the propriety of their 
activities, they would have sought first to have the Wood-to-Wood 
conveyance set aside as fraudulent before attempting to 
wrongfully execute on Baldwin's interest in the property." 
This analysis subsumes the previous issue regarding the 
reasonableness of Burtons' legal position. If Burtons honestly 
believed that they were entitled to execute upon the property 
under UCA Section 25-1-15, then none of the conduct cited in the 
Court's analysis constitutes a lack of good faith. There is 
absolutely no evidence in the record which suggests that Baldwins 
did not honestly believe in their asserted legal position or 
acted out of improper motives. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, Burtons request in the alternative: (1) 
for a reversal of the Court's prior decision and entry of 
judgment in favor of Burtons; (2) for a remand of this case to 
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the trial court for trial upon the issue of whether Baldwin was a 
bona fide purchaser? and (3) for a reversal of the trial court's 
award of attorney's fees against Burtons, due to Burtons1 
reasonable and good faith belief that their execution upon the 
property was in accordance with Utah law. 
DATED this S day of March, 1993. 
PERKINS,^SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN 
DAVID H. 
Attorney for Defendants/ 
Appellants Burton 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Paul H. Richins, 68 South Main, 8th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101 this ^ day of March, 1993. 
David H. Schwobe 
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This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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Paul H. Richins, pro se 
HALL, Chief Justice; 
Defendants Max D. Burton, Sr. , Emily A- Burton, and 
Max D. Burton, Jr., appeal from a summary judgment entered in 
favor of plaintiff Lynda C. Baldwin. We affirm. 
In considering an appeal from summary judgment, we view 
the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.1 We 
recite the facts accordingly. 
On December 19, 1979, Ralph L. and Elaine L. Kofoed 
executed a warranty deed in favor of Willard D. Wood and Tonya 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 
636 (Utah 1989). 
RECEIVED FEB 2 2 1993 
Geoffrey J . Bu t le r , Clerk 
AnncMniiw 
Glazier Wood*, thereby conveying the Kofoeds' interest in the 
property in question* The deed was recorded on December 19, 
1979. On May 1, 1980, Willard Wood executed a warranty deed to 
the same property in favor of Tonya Wood, That deed was recorded 
on May 28, 1980c 
On June 9, 1981, Max Do Burton, Sre, and Emily A. 
Burton obtained a judgment against Willard Wood and another 
person in an action brought to recover money due from a prior 
transaction-2 
On September 30, 1981, Tonya Wood executed a trust deed 
in favor of the Kofoeds as trustor and beneficiary in 
consideration of the Kofoeds' remaining equity in the property. 
That deed was signed by both Tonya and Willard Wood and was 
recorded on October 2, 1981. On that same date, Tonya Wood 
conveyed the property by warranty deed to Gregory and Lynda 
Baldwin. That deed, signed by both Tonya and Willard Wood, was 
also recorded on October 2, 1981. The Baldwins therefore took 
the property subject to the underlying mortgage, the Kofoeds7 
trust deed, and any liens of record. At the time of the 
conveyance to the Baldwins, Tonya Wood was the only record owner 
of the property in question, and there were no liens of record 
against her. 
On December 21, 1982, Gregory Baldwin quitclaimed his 
interest in the property to Lynda Baldwin/ That deed was 
recorded on December 31, 1982. 
On April 21, 1983, the Woods filed a petition for 
voluntary bankruptcy. The Burtons were listed as creditors of 
Willard Wood in the bankruptcy proceeding. The Woods' debts were 
discharged in bankruptcy in December 1983. 
The property in question was scheduled for foreclosure 
in September 198 6 under the Kofoeds' trust deed. The foreclosure 
report prepared by Surety Title Company indicated that the Burton 
judgment lien against Willard Wood had attached to the property, 
owned by Lynda Baldwin at the time, behind the first mortgage of 
2
 Prior to 1980, Max Burton, Sr., Willard Wood, and 
Clealon B. Mann were partners in Woodcove Subdivision. In 1980, 
Wood and Mann agreed to purchase Burton's interest in the 
project. Wood and Mann executed a promissory note in favor of 
Max Burton, Sr., and Emily Burton in the amount of $35,000. On 
February 25, 1981, the Burtons brought suit against Wood and Mann 
to recover the balance due under the promissory note. Summary 
judgment was entered in favor of the Burtons in the amount of 
$38,500. Sometime during September 1986, Max Burton, Sr., 
assigned his interest in the judgment against Wood to Max Burton, 
Jr. 
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Equitable Life Assurance Company and ahead of the September 30, 
1981 trust deed from Tonya Wood to the Kofoeds. 
On August 6, 198 6, the Burtons obtained a writ of 
execution authorizing the Salt Lake County Sheriff to Levy upon 
and sell enough of Willard Wood's unexempt property to satisfy 
the Burtons' judgment against him. About the same time, the 
Burtons delivered a praecipe directing the sheriff to "levy on 
the right, title and interest of Gregory Baldwin and Lynda 
Baldwin, successors in interest to Willard D. Wood*"3 
On August 11, 1986, the sheriff's office issued a 
notice of real estate levy. Under that notice, the sheriff 
levied upon all the "right, title, claim and interest of Gregory 
Baldwin and Lynda Baldwin, successors in interest to Willard D« 
Wood." The notice of real estate levy was recorded on August 12, 
1986. The sheriff's office also issued a notice of real estate 
sale, indicating that all "right, title and interest of Gregory 
Baldwin and Lynda Baldwin, successors in interest to Willard D. 
Wood," were to be sold on September 9, 1986. On August 15, 1986, 
the sheriff published notice of the real estate sale of the 
Baldwins' interest in the property. 
On September 9, 1986, the sheriff conducted an 
execution sale whereby the property was sold to the Burtons for 
$8,760. A certificate of sale-execution was subsequently issued 
indicating that all "right, title and interest of Gregory Baldwin 
and Lynda Baldwin, successors in interest of Willard D. Wood," 
had been sold to satisfy the judgment the Burtons had against 
Willard Wood. On May 7, 1987, the sheriff's office conveyed the 
Baldwins' interest in the property to the Burtons. 
On June 10, 1987, at the foreclosure under the Kofoed 
trust deed, the property was sold at a trustee's sale to 
Robert L. Rice. Rice received a trustee's deed, which was 
recorded on June 18, 1987. On that same date, Rice executed a 
warranty deed for the property in favor of Derald A. Twilley. 
The warranty deed was also recorded on June 18, 1987. Twilley 
then conveyed the property by quitclaim deed to Lynda Baldwin. 
The quitclaim deed was recorded on October 8, 1987. Lynda 
Baldwin subsequently conveyed the property by quitclaim deed to 
the Lynda C. Baldwin Trust. That deed was recorded on June 23, 
1988. 
On behalf of the Lynda C. Baldwin Trust, Lynda Baldwin 
commenced this action against the Burtons to set aside the 
3
 While the original writ of execution directed the sheriff 
to levy upon and sell unexempt real property of Willard Wood 
only, in every subsequent document, the Burtons also included 
"Gregory Baldwin and Lynda Baldwin, as successors in interest of 
Willard D. Wood." 
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sheriff's deed on the basis that execution on the property was 
improper because Willard Wood, the Burtons' judgment* debtor, had 
no interest in the property at the time the Burtons' judgment was 
docketed. Additionally, Baldwin sought to quiet title in the 
property and to have the trial court declare that the conveyance 
from Willard Wood to his wife was valid as to the Baldwins and 
that the Baldwins took the property from Tonya Wood as bona fide 
purchasersc 
Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial 
court granted Baldwin's motion, denied the Burtons' motion, and 
declared void both the sheriff's sale at which the property was 
sold to the Burtons and the sheriff's deed conveying the 
property. The trial court also found that when Max Burton, Sr., 
obtained his judgment against Willard Wood, Wood had no interest 
in the property to which a judgment lien could attache The trial 
court held that it was necessary for the Burtons to bring a 
separate action to set aside the allegedly fraudulent conveyance 
and that the statute of limitations for that action had run. In 
a subsequent order, the trial court awarded Baldwin $7,872.66 for 
attorney fees and related damages„ The Burtons appeal from these 
rulings. 
The primary issues presented on appeal are whether 
(1) a separate, prior action must be filed to set aside a 
fraudulent conveyance in a suit to foreclose and execute on a 
lien; (2) the statute of limitations bars an action by the 
Burtons to set aside the fraudulent conveyance; (3) the Baldwins 
were bona fide purchasers when they took the property from Tonya 
Wood; and (4) the trial court's award of attorney fees was 
reasonable. 
We begin by noting the applicable standard of review. 
Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.4 When reviewing an order granting summary 
judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable inferences that 
can be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion.5 The legal conclusions of the trial court 
4
 Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 
808 P.2d 1037, 1039 (Utah 1991); Utah State Coalition of Senior 
Citizens v. Utah Power & Light Co., 776 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 
1989) . 
5
 Culp Constr. Co. v. Buildmart Mall, 795 P.2d 650, 651 
(Utah 1990) . 
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are not accorded deference, but are reviewed instead for 
correctness,6 
SEPARATE ACTION FOR FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE 
The Burtons contend that before foreclosing and 
executing on a lien, it is not necessary to file a separate 
action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance. They base their 
argument on two points: First, they contend that the conveyance 
from Willard Wood to his wife was fraudulent because he was 
attempting to protect the property from creditors. The Burtons 
claim that because the conveyance was fraudulent, it was 
therefore void and Willard Wood still maintained an interest in 
the property* Because Wood maintained an interest in the 
property, the lien could attach, and it was therefore proper to 
execute on the property without having the conveyance set aside 
as fraudulent. In the alternative, the Burtons argue that 
because the conveyance was fraudulent, the Burtons could entirely 
disregard it and execute upon the property. 
The Burtons maintain that according to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-22-1,7 the judgment obtained against Willard Wood in 1981 
attached as a lien to the property. At issue is whether Willard 
Wood, the judgment debtor, had an interest in the property in 
question at the time the Burtons obtained their judgment against 
him. In order to make this determination, we must address the 
question of whether the 1980 conveyance from Willard Wood to his 
wife was void or simply voidable. 
The Burtons assert that the Utah Fraudulent Conveyances 
Act ("the Act") explicitly states that a fraudulent conveyance is 
void. To support this position, they rely on section 25-1-8 of 
the Act,8 which provides: 
Every conveyance or assignment, in 
writing or otherwise, of any estate or 
interest in lands, or in goods or things in 
6
 Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irr. Co., 813 P.2d 1169, 1171 
(Utah 1991); Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1129 
(Utah 1990). 
7
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 states, "From the time the 
judgment of the district court or circuit court is docketed . . . 
it becomes a lien upon all the real property of the judgment 
debtor . . . ." 
8
 Compare Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-1-1 to -16 (1953) (repealed 
19 88) with Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 25-6-1 to -13 (1988). Because the conveyance in question took 
place in 1980, the Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Act was still in 
effect and therefore governs this case. 
5 No. 900339 
action, or of rents or profits issuing 
therefrom, and-every -charge upon lands, goods 
or things in action or upon the rents or 
profits thereof, made with the intent to 
delay, hinder or defraud creditors, or other 
persons, of their lawful suits, damages, 
forfeitures, debts or demands, and every bond 
or other evidence of debt given, suits 
commenced, or decree or judgment suffered, 
with the like intent, as against the person 
hindered, delayed or defrauded shall be 
void*9 
Section 25-1-8 does invalidate conveyances made with 
intent to defraud. However, such conveyances are not 
automatically void. Under well-established law, a number of 
cases have held "void" to mean "voidable" only. ° Professor 
Williston, in his work on contracts, stated: 
[A] statute may and sometimes does make a 
bargain absolutely void, but even though a 
statute states it in terms, "void" has been 
held to mean "voidable." . • * 
Unless no other conclusion is possible 
from the words of a statute it should not be 
held to make agreements contravening it 
totally void.11 
In Wagner v. United States,12 the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that an assignment under 
Indiana law, although not in compliance with a statute, was 
voidable, not void. The Wagner court stated, "[E]ven when [an 
assignment] is statutorily described as being %void,' the proper 
construction is that the action is *voidable at the option of one 
9
 Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-8 (1953) (repealed 1988) (emphasis 
added). 
10
 See Harris v. Runnels, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 79, 84-85 (1851) 
(qualifications of general rule); Ewe11 v. Daggs, 108 U.S. 143, 
149 (1882); Fisher v. Thumlert, 76 P.2d 1018, 1020 (Wash. 1938). 
11
 14 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts 
§ 1630A (3d ed. 1972) (citations omitted). 
12
 573 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1978). 
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of the parties or some one [sic] legally interested 
therein. ',|13 Wacrner stated the general rule of construction 
that when an act is void as to persons who have an interest in 
impeachina it, the act is not utterly void, but merely 
voidable.I4 
Utah cases adhere to the general rule expressed above. 
This court has stated that "a contract induced by fraud, false 
representations, mistake, etc., is not void but only voidable, 
and it is entirely within the right of the injured party to 
affirm it or treat it as valid and subsisting."15 This court 
has also specifically addressed section 25-1-8 of the Act.16 
With regard to that section, we stated, "The remedy provided by 
the Act for a fraudulent conveyance is the voiding of the 
conveyance."17 These cases clearly show that some action must 
be taken by the complaining party to render a conveyance void. 
Two cases from other jurisdictions with facts similar 
to this appeal specifically address the issue of "void" versus 
"voidable." In Becker v. Becker,18 a creditor brought suit to 
set aside a transfer made by the debtor to himself and his wife. 
The creditor claimed that the transfer was made fraudulently to 
hinder the plaintiff's ability to recover on the defendant's debt 
owed to her. While the threshold issue in Becker was whether the 
transfer itself was fraudulent, the Becker court also stated: 
"A voluntary or a fraudulent conveyance is 
valid between the parties, and in fact as to 
the whole world, except those within the 
protection of the statute; thus the words 
*null' and ^void' are construed to mean 
voidable only. Therefore such conveyances 
vest the legal title in the grantee, subject 
13
 Wagner, 573 F.2d at 451-52 (quoting Doney v. Lauqhlin, 94 
N.E. 1027, 1028 (Ind. 1911)). 
14
 Wagner, 573 F.2d at 452 (citing Mutual Benefit Life Ins. 
Co. v. Winne, 49 P. 446, 449 (Mont. 1897) (discussing general 
rule of construction for "void" and "voidable")). 
15
 Frailev v. McGarrv, 211 P.2d 840, 845 (Utah 1949). 
16
 See Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987). 
17
 Idi at 1262. 
18
 416 A.2d 156 (Vt. 1980). 
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only to be divested by the creditors of the 
grantor if they choose to impeach it.1'19 
In Gurley v. Blue Rents, Inc.,20 a creditor brought 
suit to set aside an allegedly fraudulent conveyance wherein a 
debtor husband conveyed to his wife his interest in real estate 
held by the two as joint tenants. Pertinent to the issue now 
before this court, Gurley concluded that as to the grantor's 
creditors, "the conveyance is voidable [as opposed to void] an$ 
may be set aside at their option."21 
The Burtons rely on a line of cases from this court to 
support their claim that the conveyance at issue is void.22 
These cases are easily distinguishable because they involved 
either a prior proceeding where a conveyance was adjudged 
fraudulent and void or a situation where a motion to declare a 
conveyance fraudulent had been denied.23 Therefore, in all of 
those cases, one of the issues was whether the conveyance was 
actually fraudulent. In the instant case, the conveyance has hot 
been declared fraudulent or void. Furthermore, whether the 
conveyance was fraudulent is not an issue before this court. 
Hence, although section 25-1-8 of the Act uses the 
language "void," as opposed to voidable, we do not believe that 
such a strict interpretation is warranted by the applicable case 
law. The conveyance is not the type of act that is routinely 
null, but rather, it must be challenged or set aside to render it 
void. Moreover, the conveyance is not something of which all the 
world may take advantage, but only the Burtons, who claim that 
13
 Id. at 162 (quoting Jones v. Williams, 109 A. 803, 807 
(Vt. 1920)). 
20
 383 So. 2d 531 (Ala. 1980). 
21
 Id. at 536 (citing Brown v. Andrews, 257 So. 2d 356, 3^ 9 
(Ala- 1972)); see also First Nat'l Bank of Birmingham v. Love, 
167 So. 703 (Ala. 1936). 
22
 See Meyer v. General American Corp. , 569 P. 2d 1094 (Utc^ h 
1977); Jensen v. Eames, 519 P.2d 236 (Utah 1974); Cardon v. 
Harper, 151 P.2d 99 (Utah 1944); W.P. Noble Mercantile Co. v. iflt. 
Pleasant Equitable Co-Operative Inst., 42 P. 869 (Utah 1894). 
23
 Meyer, 569 P.2d at 1095 (trial court held sale void fori 
failure of fair consideration and lack of good faith); Jensen, 
519 P.2d at 237 (plaintiff urged trial court to find transfer of 
stock fraudulent conveyance under Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-1-1 to 
-16); Cardon, 151 P.2d at 100 (appeal from decree adjudging 
conveyance of land fraudulent); W.P. Noble Mercantile Co., 42 p. 
at 870 (plaintiff sought to declare assignment of real estate 
null and void). 
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tney were injured by the transfer. Because the conveyance from 
Willard Wood to his wife has not been adjudged void as a 
fraudulent conveyance, we conclude that it is voidable but not 
void. 
We next address the Burtons' argument that because the 
conveyance was fraudulent, the Burtons could, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 25-1-15, entirely disregard it and execute upon the 
property.2* Again, the Burtons claim that the conveyance was 
fraudulent because Willard Wood was attempting to shield the 
property from his creditors. While there is some record evidence 
suggesting that Willard Wood conveyed the property to his wife to 
protect it from creditors, we find little merit in this argument. 
A transfer must first be held void as fraudulent before section 
25-1-15 becomes operative.25 Although it remains in dispute, 
even if Willard Wood did admit fraud, the conveyance has not yet 
been adjudged fraudulent, and therefore, the remedy under section 
25-1-15 is not available. 
Furthermore, the Burtons cannot execute under section 
25-1-15(2) because the property is not in the hands of the 
allegedly fraudulent transferee.26 When the Burtons executed 
on the property, the land was no longer in the hands of Tonya 
Wood, the allegedly fraudulent transferee, but was owned by 
Baldwin. Because the conveyance has not been declared fraudulent 
and is not in the hands of the fraudulent transferee, section 
25-1-15 does not apply. 
In sum, since the conveyance is not void, but merely 
voidable, the Burtons could not simply disregard it and execute 
part: 
24
 Section 25-1-15 (1953) (repealed 1988) states in relevant 
Where a conveyance or obligation is 
fraudulent as to a creditor, such creditor, 
when his claim has matured, may as against 
any person, except a purchaser for fair 
consideration without knowledge of the fraud 
at the time of the purchase or one who has 
derived title immediately or mediately from 
such a purchaser: 
(2) Disregard the conveyance, and 
attach, or levy execution upon, the property 
conveyed. 
25
 See Butler, 740 P.2d at 1262 n.13. 
26
 See id. at 1262 (ff[T]he remedy [of disregarding a 
conveyance] is not available . . . when the property has been 
transferred from a fraudulent transferee to a third-party 
purchaser . . . . " ) . 
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on the property. Contrary to the Burtons' position, Willard W&od 
held no interest in the property at the time the Burtons obtained 
their judgment against him; hence, a lien did not attach and tl^ e 
Burtons could not execute on the property.27 We therefore 
conclude, as did the trial court, that it was necessary for th^ 
Burtons to bring a prior, separate action to set aside and 
declare void the allegedly fraudulent conveyance before 
foreclosing and executing on Baldwin's interest in the 
property« 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
The trial court concluded that the Burtons did not 
bring a separate action to set the conveyance aside or assert 
fraud anywhere in their pleadings. As a result, it held that the 
statute of limitations had run on bringing an action for a 
fraudulent conveyance and, therefore, as a matter of law, Willard 
Wood had no ownership interest in the property in question. The 
Burtons challenge the trial court's conclusion, 
The applicable period of limitations is found in Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3), which states in relevant part: 
Within three years: 
(3) An action for relief on the ground 
of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of 
action in such case does not accrue until the 
discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts 
constituting the fraud or mistake* 
We first determine when the three-year period of 
limitations began to accrue. In cases such as this, equity 
requires that the statute of limitations for fraud does not begin 
27
 See Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) (judgment creditor cannot place lien against property of 
judgment debtor's grantee). 
28
 See, e.g., Dahnken, Inc. of Salt Lake City v. Wilmarth, 
726 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986) (judgment creditors brought action to 
have assignment of real estate contract declared a fraudulent 
conveyance and therefore void); Furniture Mfrs. Sales, Inc. v. 
Deamer, 680 P.2d 398 (Utah 1984) (creditor brought action to s3t 
aside allegedly fraudulent conveyance from debtor to-debtor's 
wife)• 
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to run until the fraud is discovered by the injured party.29 
Baldwin argues that the Burtons were on constructive notice of 
the allegedly fraudulent conveyance and that the three-year 
period began to run on any one of three different dates: in May 
1980, when the deed from Willard Wood to his wife was recorded; 
in June 1981, when Max Burton, Sr., obtained the judgment against 
Willard Wood; or in September 1981, when the deed from Tonya Wood 
to the Baldwins was recorded. The Burtons contend that 
constructive knowledge of a transfer or the recording of a deed 
itself is not enough to constitute notice of fraud. They rely on 
Smith v. Edwards.3or where this court stated, ff%Mere 
constructive notice of the deed by reason of its being filed for 
record is not notice of the facts constituting the fraud.'"31 
Recording a deed or entering judgment alone is not enough in some 
instances to apprise a party of the fraudulent nature of a 
conveyance. However, the Burtons fail to reveal that Smith also 
provides direction for determining what constitutes discovery of 
fraud: 
To ascertain what constitutes "a 
discovery of the facts constituting the 
fraud," reference must be had to the 
principles of equity. Hence, in actions in 
equity, the rule was that the means of 
knowledge were equivalent to actual 
knowledge; that is, that a knowledge of facts 
which would have put an ordinarily prudent 
man upon inquiry which, if followed up, would 
have resulted in a discovery of the fraud, 
was equivalent to actual discovery.32 
The words "until the discovery [of fraud]11 are 
generally interpreted as meaning from the time the fraud was 
actually known or could have been discovered through the exercise 
of reasonable diligence.33 Specifically addressing section 
78-12-26(3), this court stated that the three-year statute of 
^ Esoonda v. Oaden State Bank, 283 P. 729, 731 (Utah 1929); 
see also Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 39 (10th Cir. 
1971) (applying Utah law). 
30
 17 P.2d 264 (Utah 1932). 
31
 Id. at 270 (quoting Duxburv v. Boice, 72 N.W. 838, 839 
(Minn. 1897)). 
32
 IdL (citing Duxburv, 72 N.W. at 839). 
33
 See, e.g., Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Trout, 701 P.2d 851, 
854 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Coronado Dev. Corp. v. Superior Court, 
678 P.2d 535, 537 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); Mason v. Laramie Rivers 
Co., 490 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Wyo. 1971). 
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limitations for fraud "begins to run from the time the person 
entitled to the property knows, or by reasonable diligence and 
inquiry should know, the relevant facts"34 of the fraud 
perpetrated against him. Furthermore, we have previously 
observed: "The means of knowledge is equivalent to knowledge* A 
party who has opportunity of knowing the facts constituting thte 
alleged fraud cannot be inactive and afterwards allege a want pf 
knowledge that arose by reason of his own laches and 
negligence."35 
In Mason v. Laramie Rivers Co., shareholders sought to 
challenge the issuance of stock on the ground that it was 
fraudulent. The stock was issued in February 1963, and the 
plaintiffs filed their action in July 1969. The Mason court 
found that the plaintiffs as stockholders had voted either 
personally or by proxy for the issuance of the stock at the 
February 1963 meeting. The stockholders had failed to examine 
the corporate records and had "xbeen negligent and careless of 
their own interests.'"36 The means of knowledge were open to 
the plaintiffs, and in the exercise of reasonable diligence, they 
would have discovered the alleged fraud.37 Mason held that the 
plaintiffs' action was therefore time barred by the four-year 
statute of limitations for fraud actions,38 
The Burtons argue that the alleged fraud took place 
when Willard Wood conveyed his interest in the property to his 
wife. It is conceivable that the Burtons could have discovered 
the fraud as early as May 1980, when the Wood-to-Wood deed was 
recorded. It is, however, more likely that the Burtons could 
have, or at least through the exercise of reasonable diligence 
should have, discovered the alleged fraud when the judgment 
against Willard Wood was obtained in June 1981. 
In Greco v. Pullara,39 a creditor brought an action 
to set aside a deed of trust as a fraudulent conveyance. Greccft 
^ Auerbach v. Samuels, 349 P.2d 1112, 1116 (Utah 1960). 
35
 Taylor v. Moore, 51 P.2d 222, 229 (Utah 1935) (citation 
omitted). 
36
 Mason, 490 P.2d at 1064-65 (quoting Davis v. Harrison, 
167 P.2d 1015, 1024 (Wash. 1946)). 
37
 Id. at 1065. 
38
 Id. 
444 P.2d 383 (Colo. 1968). 
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dealt with a statute similar to section 78-12-26(3)40 and 
reasoned that the limitations period "begins to run when the 
defrauded person has knowledge of facts which in the exercise of 
proper prudence and diligence would enable him to discover the 
fraud."41 The court held that the creditor was chargeable with 
constructive notice of the allegedly fraudulent conveyance at the 
time she became a judgment creditor and the statute of 
limitations began to run from the date of the judgment,42 
Inasmuch as the Burtons were attempting to execute on a 
judgment lien and the purpose of a judgment lien is to provide a 
judgment creditor a way to obtain satisfaction of a judgment, it 
logically follows that after obtaining the judgment against 
Willard Wood, the Burtons should have searched for property upon 
which to levy. Nothing in the record suggests that a search was 
performed in 1981 when the Burtons obtained their judgment 
against Willard Wood. Had a search been made, exercising 
reasonable diligence and proper prudence, it surely would have 
uncovered the transfer from Wood to his wife. Discovery of the 
transfer would then have sparked further inquiry on the part of 
the Burtons.43 If such inquiry had been pursued, the Burtons 
would have discovered facts surrounding the allegedly fraudulent 
conveyance. At the very least, discovery of the transfer should 
have incited suspicion of fraud. The Burtons may not have 
learned every detail of the alleged fraud or even discovered that 
actual fraud did in fact occur. However, it is not necessary for 
a claimant to know every fact about his fraud claim before the 
statute begins to run. The means of knowledge were available 
to the Burtons, and upon obtaining the judgment against Willard 
Wood, they should have discovered facts surrounding the alleged 
fraud. Accordingly, the three-year limitation period imposed by 
section 78-12-26(3) began to run when the Burtons' judgment 
against Willard Wood was docketed. Consequently, the Burtons' 
claim to set aside the conveyance is time-barred. 
40
 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 87-1-10 (1963) provides, "Bills for 
relief on the ground of fraud, shall be filed within three years 
after the discovery by the aggrieved party, of the facts 
constituting such fraud, and not afterwards." 
41
 Greco, 444 P.2d at 384 (citations omitted). 
42
 Id. 
43
 A party is required to make inquiry if his findings would 
prompt further investigation. See Diversified Equities v. 
American Sav. & Loan, 739 P.2d 1133, 1137 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987), cert, dismissed, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989). 
44
 See Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer, 125 Cal. Rptr. 59, 68 
(1975) . 
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BONA FIDE PURCHASER 
Implicit in the trial court's findings is that when the 
Baldwins purchased the property from Tonya Wood, they took the[ 
property as bona fide purchasers. A bona fide purchaser is one 
who pays valuable consideration for a conveyance, acts in good 
faith, and takes without notice of an adverse claim or others' 
outstanding rights to the seller's title.45 Therefore, under 
the Act, even if the conveyance from Wood to his wife was 
fraudulent, Baldwin's interest as a bona fide purchaser is not 
affected by the Burtons' execution on the property.46 
The Burtons argue that the Baldwins were not bona fi|de 
purchasers when they purchased the property from Tonya Wood 
because the Baldwins had notice of the judgment lien against 
Willard Wood. The judgment lien therefore created an adverse 
interest in the property. The Burtons assert that the Baldwinls 
had actual notice of the judgment lien by virtue of a title 
report issued by the Baldwins' title agent. There is no evidence 
in the title report that would give the Baldwins notice of the 
judgment lien against Willard Wood. More importantly, we have 
already determined that the conveyance was voidable, and at th£ 
time the Burtons obtained their judgment against Willard Wood, 
Wood held no interest in the property. Thus, the lien could not 
attach. When the Baldwins purchased the property from Tonya 
Wood, she was the only owner of record. While there was a 
judgment against Willard Wood, no liens of record existed agaihst 
the Baldwins' immediate grantor, Tonya Wood. As a result, the 
Baldwins did not discover any judgment liens on the property and 
therefore had no notice of any adverse interest in the property. 
In the alternative, the Burtons contend that the 
Baldwins had constructive notice of the fraudulent nature of tfce 
conveyance from Tonya Wood to the Baldwins. The Burtons base 
their contention on the fact that the 1980 conveyance was of 
record and Willard Wood later signed the warranty deed that 
conveyed the property to the Baldwins. According to the Burtons, 
^ See Pender v. Dowse, 265 P.2d 644, 648 (Utah 1954); 
Peterson v. Peterson, 190 P.2d 135, 138 (Utah 1948); J.C Equifl., 
Inc. v. Sky Aviation, Inc., 498 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1973); Glaser v. Holdorf, 352 P.2d 212, 215 (Wash. 1960). 
46
 Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-13 states: 
Bona fide purchasers not affected. The 
provisions of this chapter shall not be 
construed to affect or impair the title of a 
purchaser for a valuable consideration, 
unless it appears that such purchaser had 
previous notice of the fraudulent intent of 
his immediate grantor, or of the fraud 
rendering void the title of such grantor. 
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this was enough to extend notice to the Baldwins of the 
possibility of fraud in the conveyance and to cause the Baldwins 
to question Tonya Wood's ability to reconvey the property. 
We disagree. In accordance with the above discussion, 
the conveyance has not been determined to be fraudulent and was 
therefore valid. Upon purchasing the property, the Baldwins had 
no reason to believe otherwise. Accordingly, at the time of the 
purchase, Tonya Wood was the only owner of record. The fact that 
Willard Wood signed the warranty deed conveying the property to 
the Baldwins does not affect Tonya Wood's title to the property, 
nor does it put the Baldwins on notice to inquire further into 
Willard Wood's interest in the property.47 
In conclusion, we hold, in accordance with the 
requirements of section 25-1-13, that the Baldwins took the 
property without "notice of the fraudulent intent of [their] 
immediate grantor, or of the fraud rendering void the title of 
such grantor," and were therefore bona fide purchasers. Because 
the Baldwins were bona fide purchasers, the Burtons were further 
precluded from executing on the Baldwins' interest in the 
property. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Subsequent to the entry of summary judgment, Baldwin 
submitted an affidavit of attorney fees, setting forth a detailed 
summary of costs. She requested $12,715.25 in attorney fees and 
costs, 8 and the Burtons objected. Following a hearing, the 
trial court entered judgment in favor of Baldwin, requiring the 
Burtons to pay $7,872.66 in attorney fees and related damages. 
The Burtons appeal, arguing that the award of attorney fees was 
improper because the trial court did not indicate a legal basis 
for its conclusion. 
47
 A duty of inquiry requires a party to investigate and 
diligently do what his or her findings would reasonably prompt. 
The title search performed by the Baldwins showed Tonya Wood as 
the only titled owner of record. It is not reasonable to think 
that such a finding would prompt them to inquire further. See 
Diversified Equities, 739 P.2d at 1137 & n.5 (purchasers who 
reasonable relied on title search did not need to make further 
inquiry). 
48
 Baldwin requested $3,192 in attorney fees, $328.06 in 
secretarial fees, and $9,195.19 in paralegal costs. 
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When reviewing an award of attorney fees, we will 
affirm the trial court's ruling absent an abuse of 
discretion.49 The general rule is that an award of attorney 
fees is appropriate only if authorized by statute or 
contract. ° We note a statutory basis for the award of 
attorney fees under Utah Code Ann<> § 78-27-56. Section 
78-27-56(1) provides in part that "the court shall award 
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court 
determines that the action or defense to the action was without 
merit and not brought or asserted in good faith." We begin our 
analysis by addressing whether an award of attorney fees under 
section 78-27-56 was appropriate in this case and continue by 
addressing whether the amount of attorney fees awarded by the 
trial court was reasonable. 
For a party to be entitled to attorney fees under 
section 78-27-56, the trial court must determine that a claim ils 
"without merit" and that the party's conduct in bringing the su|it 
"was lacking in good faith."51 In Cady, we defined both of 
these elements, stating that "without merit" means "frivolous" or 
"having no basis in law or fact."52 For purposes of section 
78-27-56, we found the terms "lack of good faith" and "bad faith" 
to be synonymous.53 To establish bad faith, one or more of the 
following must be lacking: "Ml) A n honest belief in the 
propriety of the activities in question; (2) no intent to take 
unconscionable advantage of others; (3) no intent to, or 
knowledge of the fact that the activities in question will, [sijs] 
hinder, delay or defraud others.'"54 
The Burtons' 198 6 execution on Baldwin's property 
compelled her to bring this action. The Burtons claim that their 
execution on Baldwin's property was neither without merit nor 
brought in bad faith. They contend that after learning of the 
scheduled foreclosure on the property, they proceeded to execute 
on the property as would any reasonable creditor under the 
49
 Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 
1988) (citing Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 
645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982)). 
50
 Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 988; Golden Key Realty, 
Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 1985); Turtle Management^, 
Inc., 645 P.2d at 671. 
51 
52 
53 
Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983) 
Id. 
Id. at 151-52. 
54
 Id. at 151 (quoting Tacoma Assoc, of Credit Men v. 
Lester, 433 P.2d 901, 904 (Wash. 1967)). 
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circumstances. However, the record supports the trial court's 
findings that there was no factual or legal justification for the 
Burtons7 actions. At the time the Burtons obtained their 
judgment, Willard Wood held no interest in the property. The 
Burtons' only lien rights in this matter were against the 
judgment debtor, Wood. Furthermore, contrary to the Burtons' 
assertion, when the Baldwins took the property from Tonya Wood, 
they were in no way successors in interest to Willard Wood and 
they were not subject to liability on the Burtons' judgment 
against Willard Wood. The Burtons were in error both factually 
and legally when they executed on the interest of Baldwin, the 
owner of the property. 
Additionally, the Burtons exhibited a lack of good 
faith. The writ of execution appeared to be correct on its face 
in that it directed the sheriff to levy upon and sell Willard 
Wood's unexempt real property to satisfy the Burtons' judgment. 
However, the Burtons then issued a praecipe directing the sheriff 
to levy on the "right, title, and interest of Gregory Baldwin and 
Lynda Baldwin, successors in interest of Willard D. Wood." From 
that point forward, all subsequent documents leading up to the 
sale of the property were in error. The Baldwins were not 
successors in interest of Willard Wood and should never have been 
included in the execution proceedings. Had the Burtons proceeded 
with an honest belief in the propriety of their activities, they 
would have sought first to have the Wood-to-Wood conveyance set 
aside as fraudulent before attempting to wrongfully execute on 
Baldwin's interest in the property. Accordingly, we hold that 
Baldwin is entitled to an award of attorney fees under section 
78-27-56. 
In regard to the reasonableness of the amount of 
attorney fees awarded by the trial court, calculation of such 
fees is within the sound discretion of the trial court.55 
However, the trial court's award of attorney fees must be based 
on and supported by evidence in the record.56 This court has 
developed factors for trial courts to consider when evaluating 
evidence to determine what constitutes a reasonable fee.57 
Those factors include but are not limited to the extent of 
services rendered, the difficulty of issues involved, the 
reasonableness of time spent on the case, fees charged in the 
locality for similar services, and the necessity of bringing an 
55
 Jenkins v. Bailev. 676 P.2d 391, 393 (Utah 1984). 
56
 Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 988; Jenkins, 676 P.2d at 
393. 
57
 See Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 989; Travner v. 
Cushina, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984); Jenkins, 676 P.2d at 393; 
Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1983); Wallace v. 
Build. Inc., 402 P.2d 699, 701 (Utah 1965). 
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action to vindicate rights.58 In light of these factors, the 
attorney fee award appears to be reasonable. The evidence in the 
record supports the award, as does the fact that the trial court, 
in its discretion, substantially reduced the amount requested py 
Baldwin. 
The Burtons also argue that even if we find that the 
trial court's award of attorney fees was proper, Baldwin is not 
entitled to recover paralegal costs * While the trial court dip 
not specifically delineate any portion of the $7,872.66 as 
paralegal costs, the Burtons concluded that because only $3,192 
of the total amount requested by Baldwin was for attorney feesL 
the remaining $4,680.66 must have been for paralegal costs. The 
Burtons contend that paralegal costs are not recoverable under 
Utah law and that cases which have found the award of paralegal 
fees to be appropriate involve instances where the paralegal 
performed under the direction and supervision of an attorney.5* 
According to the Burtons, Paul Richins, an independent paralegal 
used by Baldwin's attorney, operated outside the attorney's 
control when he prepared a billing statement separate from the 
attorney's. 
Simple arithmetic shows that at least some portion of 
the $7,872.66 awarded by the trial court was for paralegal costs. 
This court has never specifically addressed the issue of whether 
paralegal fees are recoverable as part of an award of attorney 
fees. We do so now with regard to the facts of this case. 
In Continental Townhouses East Unit One Ass'n v. 
Brockbank,6Q the Arizona Court of Appeals considered the issue 
of whether the value of legal work performed by legal 
assistants61 could be considered as an element of attorney 
fees.62 The plaintiffs' request for attorney fees included an 
itemization of hourly rates and time spent for both attorneys &nd 
legal assistants. Recognizing that the use of legal assistants 
has become an increasingly essential element of legal services 
provided by many law offices, the court ultimately held that 
services provided by legal assistants "may properly be included 
58
 See Travner, 688 P.2d at 858; Cabrera, 694 P.2d at 625; 
Wallace, 402 P.2d at 701. 
59
 See, e.g., Multi-moto v. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 806 
S.W.2d 560, 570 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991). 
60
 733 P.2d 1120 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). 
61
 The Brockbank court used the terms legal assistant, 
paralegal, and law clerk interchangeably in its opinion. Id. ^t 
1128 n.9. 
62
 Id. at 1126. 
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as elements in attorney fees applications and awards,"63 The 
rationale of the court was that allowing recovery for legal 
assistant fees promotes lawyer efficiency and decreases client 
litigation costs because a lawyer's time is free from tasks a 
legal assistant can perform at a lower rate-64 The Brockbank 
court further noted that services performed by legal assistants 
are properly considered a component of attorney fees and are not 
automatically included in a lawyer's hourly billing rate as part 
of standard law office operating expenses but are often itemized 
and billed separately,65 
Applying the reasoning of Brockbank to the facts of 
this case, it is clear that had Baldwin's attorney not retained 
Richins to perform services traditionally performed by legal 
assistants, the attorney would have had to perform these services 
himself at a presumably higher billing rate- Taking into account 
the trial court's substantial reduction in the amount requested, 
especially in the area of paralegal costs, and having concluded 
that the total award of attorney fees was reasonable, we find 
that it was proper for the trial court to include services 
provided by the paralegal in its award of attorney fees. 
In short, this court finds that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in awarding Baldwin reasonable attorney 
fees. We therefore do not disturb the trial court's ruling. 
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW 
While not an issue raised on appeal, we deem it 
appropriate to address a peripheral matter brought to our 
attention during oral argument- As noted above, Paul Richins 
assisted Baldwin's attorney as a paralegal. After judgment was 
entered in favor of Baldwin, Richins took assignment of the 
judgment. Richins then appeared pro se before this court, 
arguing in favor of Baldwin's position to uphold the trial 
court's rulings. While Richins is free to take assignment of the 
judgment and appear on his own behalf to represent his interests 
in the matter, such a practice gives rise to at least the 
appearance of practicing law without a license. 
Rule 5.5 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 
prohibits lawyers from engaging in or assisting others in 
activities that constitute the unauthorized practice of law. 
While this might very well be an isolated incident, we are 
concerned that it might have the far-reaching effect of inspiring 
other members of the bar to similarly assign judgments to lay 
Id. at 1127. 
64
 Id. 
Id. at 1127-28. 
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persons. In light of what is easily avoidable, we exhort all 
members of the bar to refrain from entering into such 
arrangements. 
WE CONCUR: 
Richard C, Howe, Associate 
Chief Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
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